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An Overlapping Generations Model
with Two Periods and Perfect Foresight
1 Introduction
The overlapping generations (OLG) model together with the Ramsey model are the main
models used in macroeconomics. The Ramsey model is said to be an optimal macroe-
conomic model because the general equilibrium of the decentralized economy verifies the
First Welfare Theorem (FWT) (= satisfies the Pareto optimal criterion). The specificity
of the OLG model is its demographic structure: in each period, there is a generation of
young and a generation of old agents trading in the markets. Apart from their age dif-
ference, these two groups are distinguished by their resources. The young live on labour
income while the old live on capital income (= their saving + the interest on their saving).
In an OLG model, the general equilibrium of the decentralized economy may not satisfy
the FWT. This therefore leaves room for public intervention to improve the welfare of
economic agents (= Second Welfare Theorem (SWT)).
The OLG model is due to Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965).
2 Setup
Let us consider a closed economy with perfectly competitive markets. Time is discrete.
The economy starts at time t = 0 and its horizon is infinite. We will assume that at t = 0,
the economy starts with positive endowments in physical capital and labor (people born
old) reflecting its history. We will also assume that there is no money, no government and
no bequest between generations. Finally, we consider that the future is certain. Therefore,
the agents can perfectly forecast the future values of all variables. We say that the agents
have prefect foresight.
At each period t, there exist three goods: physical capital, labor and an aggregate output
produced from physical capital and labor. Each of these goods is traded and priced on a
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market: the capital market for the physical capital, the labor market for labor and the
goods market for the output.
The demographic structure
At each period t, a generation indexed by t of Nt individuals is born and lives for two
periods. At time t, the individuals of generation t are young, they work, consume and
save for their old days. At time t + 1, the individuals of generation t are old, they give
birth to the generation t + 1, they consume their saving and the accrued interests, and
at the end of the period, they die without leaving any bequest to their offspring. We
assume that the size of each generation is larger by a constant rate n than the previous
generation:
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt (1)
where Nt is the number of individuals of generation t. We assume that n ∈ ]−1,+∞[
so the population can possibly shrink at a constant rate. At each period t, the total
population is composed of two generations: a generation t of young individuals and a
generation of t− 1 of old individuals. The growth rate of the total population is n:
Nt+1 +Nt = (1 + n) (Nt +Nt−1) (2)
Proof: Nt+1 +Nt = (1 + n)Nt + (1 + n)Nt−1 = (1 + n) (Nt +Nt−1) 
3 Consumption and Saving
The consumers’ preferences
The preferences of the representative consumer1 over their consumption bundle in the
two periods of their life can be represented by an additively separable life-cycle utility
function:
U(ct, dt+1) = u(ct) + βu(dt+1) (3)
where U(.) is the life-cycle utility, u(.) is the instantaneous utility, ct is consumption
when the representative consumer is young, dt+1 is consumption when she is old and
β is a parameter, called a pyschological discount factor, indicating the degree of her
impatience. Impatience implies that β < 1, i.e. the representative consumer values the
present consumption more than the future consumption.
Assumptions on the instantaneous utility function:
For all c, d > 0, u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0 and limc,d−→0 u
′(.) = +∞.
These assumptions mean that the instantaneous utility function is monotonically increas-
ing and concave.
1In standard macroeconomic models, it is assumed that there are a representative consumer and a
representative firm. This simplifying assumption can mean that all individuals are the same or can be
”represented” by an average individual.
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The representative consumer lives on income throughout her life: labor income when
young and capital income when old. At each period, she therefore has a budget constraint:
ct + st = wt (4)
dt+1 = Rt+1st (5)
On the right-hand side of the two equations, there are the incomes: wt (labor income)
and Rt+1st (capital income) where st is the individual saving and Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 is the
interest factor (rt+1 is the interest rate). On the left-hand side, there are the spendings:
consumption ct and saving st during the first period of life and consumption dt+1 in
the second period. By using the expression of st of the second-period budget constraint






Equation (6) is the present value at time t of the life-cycle consumption, which is equal to
the labor income earned in the first period. In other words, the representative consumer
has to allocate her labor income between consumption in her young age and consumption
in her old days. How is the intertemporal allocation of labor income determined? By the
utility function (3) representing her preferences between the present and the future.
The consumers’ optimization problem
The optimization problem of the representative consumer consists in allocating her labor
income over her life cyle to reach an optimal level of utility. Mathematically, this problem
is the maximization of the utility function (3) with respect to the budget constraints, or
equivalently, to the intertemporal budget constraint. The optimal solution to this problem
is to find the optimal level of saving st, i.e. the part of the wage that will be transfered to
the second period. There are two ways to calculate the optimal saving: by substitution
or by using the Lagrangian.
Solving by substitution
We substitute ct and dt+1 in the utility function (3):
u(wt − st) + βu(Rt+1st) (7)
which now is a function of the unknown st, which we want to calculate at the optimum.
The solution to this maximization problem is the optimal saving. For a given instanta-
neous utility function, the optimal saving
st = φ(wt, Rt+1) (8)
is a function of two prices: the real wage (price of labor) and the real interest factor (the
price of physical capital). Maximizing (7) with respect to st gives the first-order condition:
−u′(wt − st) + βRt+1u′(Rt+1st) = 0 (9)
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which leads to
u′(wt − st) = βRt+1u′(Rt+1st) (10)
which means that the marginal utility of first-period consumption is equal to the marginal
utility of second-period consumption multiplied by a factor equal to βRt+1.
Examplell : the log-utility function
U(ct, dt+1) = ln(ct) + β ln(dt+1) (11)
By substituting ct and dt+1 in the utility function, we obtain
U(ct, dt+1) = ln(wt − st) + β ln(Rt+1st) (12)












When utility is logarithmic, the optimal saving depends on the wage but not on the
interest factor. The reason is that the income effect and the substitution effect of an
increase in the interest factor on saving offset each other exactly.
Solving by Lagrange’s method
We use the intertemporal budget constraint (6) and build the Lagrangian:
L(ct, dt+1, λt) = u(ct) + βu(dt+1) + λt
(





The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂ct

















which is the same as Equation (10).
2This first-order condition is often referred to as the Euler equation.
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Examplell : the log-utility function
L(ct, dt+1, λt) = ln(ct) + β ln(dt+1) + λt
(


























By eliminating the Lagrange multiplier λt, we obtain
dt+1 = βRt+1ct (24)





which is the same as Equation (14).
Ambiguity of the saving function’s response to factor price movements
Equation (10) or, equivalently, Equation (19) give the condition for the consumer to reach
the optimal level of utility during her life cycle. The solution satisfying this condition
is the optimal saving. Once the instantanous utility is specified, the optimal saving is a
function of two prices (see Equation (8)): the level of the wage and the level of the interest
factor. The effects of the wage and the interest factor on optimal saving thus depends on
the form of the saving function, which is itself a function of the instantanous utility.
Since saving is the fundamental element of our dynamic model, it is crucial to know the
properties of the saving function. In particular, we would like to know how optimal saving
responds to an increase in the wage or in the interest factor. Unfortunately, we do not
have, for a general utility function such as (3), an explicit function between st and its
arguments, wt and Rt+1, to answer our question. However, we can use the implicit function
theorem to do so. This powerful theorem allows to compute the partial derivatives we want
without knowing the explicit formula between st and wt and Rt+1. Two conditions are
necessary for this theorem to apply. The first condition is the existence of a continuous











t ) = 0.
3 This first condition is met thanks to Equation
3where sot is the value of the optimal saving when the wage and the interest factor have the particular
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(10). Let us define this relation as
Ω(wt, Rt+1, st) ≡ −u′(wt − st) + βRt+1u′(Rt+1st) (26)
which is equal to zero whenever st is an optimum. For instance, assume that s
o
t is an







t ) = 0. The second condition is that the partial derivative of Ω(wt, Rt+1, st)
















= u′′(wot − sot ) + β(Rot+1)2u′′(Rot+1sot ) < 0 (27)
The second condition is met since the required partial derivative is nonzero. As a result,
we can apply the implicit function theorem, which guarantees the existence of a unique




t+1) such that, for all





Ω [wt, Rt+1, φ(wt, Rt+1)] = 0 (28)



















∂ Ω [wt, Rt+1, φ(wt, Rt+1)]
∂φ(wt, Rt+1)
= u′′(wt − st) + βR2t+1u′′(Rt+1st) (31)
Ω′wt =
∂ Ω [wt, Rt+1, φ(wt, Rt+1)]
∂wt
= −u′′(wt − st) (32)
Ω′Rt+1 =
∂ Ω [wt, Rt+1, φ(wt, Rt+1)]
∂Rt+1
= βu′(Rt+1st) + βRt+1stu
′′(Rt+1st) (33)
Recall that u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0 by assumption. It is then straightforward to obtain
the signs of the partial derivatives of the relation Ω [wt, Rt+1, φ(wt, Rt+1)]:
Ω′st < 0 (34)
Ω′wt > 0 (35)
Ω′Rt+1 S 0 (36)
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From Equations (29) and (30), we can find the partial derivatives of the saving function
we have been looking for4:
∂st
∂wt


















u′′(wt − st) + βR2t+1u′′(Rt+1st)
(38)
The partial derivatives of the saving function st = φ(wt, Rt+1), defined implicitly, can now
be characterized:
0 < φ′wt < 1 (39)
φ′Rt+1 S 0 (40)
The inequality (39) says that the effect of the wage on optimal saving is strictly positive
and bounded above by the value 1. The function φ′wt is called the marginal propensity
to save and the inequality (39) says that an optimizing consumer must save a positive
amount but less than her labor income.
The inequality (40) says that the effect of the interest factor on optimal saving is ambigu-
ous. Observe that the denominator of (38) is always negative. Therefore, the ambiguity









where σ(Rt+1st) ≡ − u
′(Rt+1st)
u′′(Rt+1st)Rt+1st
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution evalu-
ated at dt+1 = Rt+1st. Therefore, there are three possible cases for the inequality (40):
If σ(Rt+1st) < 1 =⇒ φ′Rt+1 < 0 (42)
If σ(Rt+1st) = 1 =⇒ φ′Rt+1 = 0 (43)
If σ(Rt+1st) > 1 =⇒ φ′Rt+1 > 0 (44)
Case (43) deserves a comment. This case corresponds to the situation where a change in
the interest factor Rt+1 has no effect on optimal saving. It may seem strange that the
interest factor has no effect on saving. In fact, the interest factor has two opposite effects.
The first is an incentive effect: the higher the interest factor, the more profitable it is
to save more, since the return on saving is higher. This effect is called the income effect
of the interest factor and it is positive on saving. The second effect is a windfall effect:
4Observe that Ω′st 6= 0 is required for the solutions to exist. This is precisely the second condition of
the implicit function theorem that was mentioned earlier.
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the higher the interest factor, the higher the future income and therefore the greater the
opportunity to save less and consume more today. This effect is called the substitution
effect of the interest factor and it is negative on saving. In Case (43), these two effects
cancel each other out, which explains why the interest factor has no effect on saving.
Because of the ambiguity of the inequality (40), the total effect of the wage and the
interest factor on optimal saving is ambiguous and depends on the specification of the
utility function. We can single out two cases where the saving function’s response is not
ambiguous:
Case 1: If σ(Rt+1st) > 1 =⇒ φ′wtdwt + φ
′
Rt+1
dRt+1 > 0 (45)





wtdwt > 0 (46)
The last possible case is the one for which the saving function’s response is ambiguous:
Case 3: If σ(Rt+1st) < 1 =⇒ φ′wtdwt + φ
′
Rt+1
dRt+1 S 0 (47)
Depending on the specification of the instantaneous utility function, the substitution
effect of the interest factor on saving, which is negative, will be more or less strong. The
stronger it is, the more negative φ′Rt+1 will be, and the more likely the total effect on
saving, φ′wtdwt + φ
′
Rt+1
dRt+1, will be negative. For some utility functions, satisfying the
assumptions we have made, an increase in the interest factor reduces saving.
Examplell : the log-utility function





This function shows that optimal saving depends positively on the wage but does not
depend on the interest factor. In fact, the log-utility function corresponds to Case 2 due
to the specific condition described by expression (43).
4 Production
We assume that the aggregate ouptut is produced by all the firms of the domestic economy.
These firms can be represented by a representative firm. The technological frontier of the
production possibility set can be represented by a production function. This production
function is called the technological constraint of the firms. The production function is the
following
Yt = AF (Kt, Lt) (48)
where Yt is the output at time t, Kt is the physical capital stock, Lt is the labor force,
A is the total factor productivity (constant), and F (.) is the transformation function of
inputs (production factors) into output Yt.
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Assumptions on the production function:
We assume that F (.) is neoclassical, .i.e, it is twice differentiable, positively valued (its
domain is R+), increasing in its arguments (first derivatives are positive: ∂F (.)∂K > 0,
∂F (.)
∂L






< 0). We also
assume that F (.) is homogeneous of degree one, i.e. it has constant returns to scale: for
any λ > 0, F (λK, λL) = λF (K,L).
Examplell : the Cobb-Douglas production function: AKαt L
1−α






















= −α(1− α)AKαt Lα−2t < 0
Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas production function is a concave function in its arguments
Kt and Lt. As for the constant returns to scale assumption:
A (λKt)
α (λLt)







Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas production satisfies the constant returns to scale assump-
tion.
The firm’s optimization problem
The objective of the representative firm is to maximize profit. The profit function of the
firm is
πt = PtYt − R̃tKt − w̃tLt (49)
where πt is profit at time t, Pt is the price of the output, R̃t is the nominal interest factor























≡ wt is the real wage and R̃tPt ≡ Rt is the real interest factor at time t. We
generally consider the price of the ouptut P as the numéraire (we can set Pt ≡ 1 without
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loss of generality but it is not necessary). Therefore, we can rewrite the real wage and









Since markets are perfectly competitive, the factor prices (54) and (55) cannot be influ-
enced by any of the economic agents who are price-takers. Therefore, at given market
factor prices, Equation (54) determines the labor demand and Equation (55) determines
the demand for physical capital.
Examplell : the Cobb-Douglas production function: AKαt L
1−α
t where 0 < α < 1.
When the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the factor prices are












Since markets are perfectly competitive, πt = 0 for all t and then the whole output has
to be redistributed to production factors Kt and Lt such as
Yt = RtKt + wtLt (58)
We can observe that the allocation of incomes is generational: labor income is allocated
to the young generation who work and capital income is allocated to the old generation,
retired, who own the capital, i.e. shares of the firms. This capital is purchased when
young and is consumed when old.
Examplell : the Cobb-Douglas production function: AKαt L
1−α
t where 0 < α < 1.
When the production function is Cobb-Douglas, it is possible to check that the remuner-
















which is equal to the aggregate production Yt.
It is useful to express the production function and the marginal returns to production
factors in intensive form, i.e. per worker.5 There are two reasons. The first reason is
5In an OLG model, per-worker variables and per-capita variables are not equivalent since the old
generation does not work. Variables per capita imply the division of variables by the total population
composed of two generations.
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mathematical. In aggregate form, production is a function of two variables: physical
capital and labor. If we divide the output and capital by labor, the problem reduces to a
two-dimensional problem, which is easier to study. The second reason is economic. The
study of economic development and wealth makes sense if we can measure it at the level
of a person or a worker. In macroeconomics, we are interested in the evolution of wealth
of people over time. Therefore, by dividing the output and capital by labor, we study the
income per worker over time.
The transformation of the aggregate production function (48) into the production func-
tion per worker is not straightforward. It is necessary that the aggregate production is
homogeneous of degree 1. Recall that we assumed that the production function had con-
stant returns to scale. Therefore, it is possible to divide the production factors Kt and Lt
by Lt and obtain
yt = AF (kt, 1) (60)
where yt ≡ YtLt is the income per worker and kt ≡
Kt
Lt
is the so-called capital-labor ratio.
We can rewrite the production function (60) as
yt = Af(kt) (61)

























Af ′(kt) = Af
′(kt) (63)
By assumption on the first derivatives of the production function (48), the marginal
returns to production factors are positive. This means that we assume that the factor
prices are postive, which is fairly realistic!!
Examplell : the Cobb-Douglas production function: AKαt L
1−α
t where 0 < α < 1.
When the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the production function and its marginal









The goods market The goods market at any time t must satisfy the national income
accounts identity where resources are equal to spending:
Yt = Ct + It (67)
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where Ct is aggregate consumption and It is aggregate investment (= flow in capital
goods), which is the consumption of firms. The sum Ct + It is total spending in the
economy.
The capital market The equilibrium of the capital market (in a closed economy) is
simply a rewriting of the national income accounts identity:
Yt − Ct = It (68)
where Yt − Ct = St is aggregate saving. In a closed economy, aggregate saving is always
equal to aggregate investment. This is an accounting construction:
St = It (69)
Aggregate saving is the sum of individuals’ saving, i.e. the part of labor income that is
saved by the young generation:6
St = Ntst (70)
Aggregate investment is the difference between the stocks of capital at two different time
periods:
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (71)
where δ is the rate of physical depreciation of the capital stock. In the OLG model in
discrete time, a period is assumed to be equal to a working life, i.e. approximately 30
years. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the capital stock fully depreciates at the
end of a period. Therefore, we assume that δ = 1, which means
It = Kt+1 (72)
where Kt+1 is the physical capital stock at time t+ 1. The capital market equilibrium is
therefore given by the following condition:
Kt+1 = Ntst (73)
where st is the individual saving function (8). The equilibrium is obtained when the factor
prices are such that the optimal saving of the representative consumer (determined by
the consumer’s optimization) corresponds to the optimal amount of capital used by the
representative firm (determined by the firm’s optimization).
The labor market We assume that the supply of labor is inelastic, which means that the
supply of labor does not depend on the market wage. The labor market is in equilibrium
if its supply is equal to the demand. When the supply of labor is inelastic, the wage
depends only on the demand for labor, which is determined by the firms’ optimization
program, i.e., the maximization of profit.
6In the Solow model, aggregate saving is a constant fraction of total income. This simplyfing assump-
tion is relaxed in the OLG model where agents adjust their saving depending on their wage and the
interest rate.
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6 The macroeconomic equilibrium
The macroeconomic equilibrium is the general equilibrium in the three interdependent
markets: the goods market, the capital market and the labor market. The equilibrium
condition in all three markets is given by the equality between supply and demand. Since
the markets are perfectly competitive, the equilibrium prices of the three markets corre-
spond to the marginal cost of production of the aggregate output good.
The macroeconomic equilibrium is a general equilibrium at one point in time (temporary
equilibrium) and over time (intertemporal equilibrium). The temporary equilibrium is
obtained when the three markets clear at one point in time. On the labor market, the
workforce is employed and remunerated at the equilibrium real wage. On the goods
market, the output produced is sold at the equilibrium price to buyers who consume
part of it and save the remaining part. Saving is traded on the capital market at the
expected return to investors who will use it to build a physical asset that will carry over
time, though imperfectly due to physical depreciation. The capital market thus makes the
link between the present and the future. This link is represented by the unique dynamic
equation of the model, which is also the temporary equilibrium of the capital market (73).
Given the individual optimal saving function (8), the dynamic equation of the OLG model
with two periods and perfect foresight can be rewritten as
Kt+1 = Ntφ(wt, Rt+1) (74)
and, in terms of per worker,
(1 + n)kt+1 = φ(wt, Rt+1) (75)
where k ≡ K
L
is the physical capital stock per worker or, for short, the capital-labor ratio.
Equation (75) describes the physical capital accumulation per worker over time. The
solution to the dynamic equation (75) establishes the intertemporal equilibrium, i.e. the
macroeconomic equilibrium between the present and the future. However, the existence
and uniqueness of the solution to the dynamic equation (75) is not straightforward. Recall
that Rt+1 is a function of kt+1 (see Equation (55)) while wt is a function of kt (see Equation
(54)). Then, observe that kt+1 is a function of the optimal saving function φ(.) and φ(.)
is a function of kt+1. Therefore, the solution consists in finding the value for kt+1 that
guarantees the general equilibrium at period t and the general equilibrium at period t+1.
In other words, for a given kt, does kt+1 exist and is it unique? Since there is no explicit
function between kt+1 and its argument kt, we can define the implicit relation
∆(wt, kt+1) ≡ (1 + n)kt+1 − φ(wt, Rt+1) (76)
which is equal to zero whenever kt+1 is a solution (= intertemporal equilibrium) to Equa-
tion (75).
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Existence of an intertemporal equilibrium
In order to conclude that there exists at least one solution to Equation (75), it is necessary
to show that
∆(wt, kt+1) ≡ (1 + n)kt+1 − φ(wt, Rt+1) = 0 (77)
occurs at least once. For a given wt > 0, it is possible to show that ∆(wt, kt+1) takes
negative values when kt+1 −→ 0 and takes positive values when kt+1 −→ +∞. Since it is
continuous with respect kt+1, ∆(wt, kt+1) necessarily equals 0 for a positive kt+1 (see the
existence proof in de la Croix & Michel (2002), pp. 20-21).
This proof establishes the existence of the solution to the dynamic equation (75) without
additional assumptions.
Uniqueness of the intertemporal equilibrium
A necessary condition for the uniqueness of the solution is that ∆(wt, kt+1) = 0 is strictly
increasing in kt+1 (see de la Croix & Michel (2002), pp. 22-23). However, the assumptions
we have made so far do not ensure that it is always the case. Therefore, we have to make
an additional assumption:




′′(kt+1) > 0 (78)
where, I recall, Rt+1 = Af





where the right-hand side of the inequality is negative. This implies that no all concave
utility functions qualify. For instance, a utility function leading to a reduction in saving
higher than 1+n
Af ′′(kt+1)
when the interest factor increases at the margin would not qualify.
Thanks to assumption (78), the intertemporal equilibrium is unique at any t, which implies
that there is a unique trajectory of the macroeconomic equilibrium over time.
Unfortunately, the uniqueness condition (78) is not easily translated into assumptions on
preferences and production technology. Therefore, a stronger but sufficient condition is
to assume that the utility function must have an intertemporal elasticity of substitution
greater or equal to one:




Examplell : OLG model with logarithmic utility function and Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion
By using Equation (14), we can write the dynamic equation of an OLG model with
logarithmic utility function and Cobb-Douglas production function as
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Since wt = (1 − α)Akαt when the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, the capital
accumulation equation per worker can be rewritten as




Equation (82) shows that kt+1 exists and is uniquely defined by the past value kt and a
bunch of parameters. This equation can be applied to all t and thus defines the dynamic
trajectory of this economy.
The steady state
Is our dynamic model converging to a stationary (or steady) state? This is the fundamen-
tal question that must be answered when studying a dynamic model. In this section, we
want to know whether a decentralized (=market) economy can converge to a steady state.
In other words, does a decentralized economy follow a convergent trajectory or not? If
yes, we can characterize this steady state and draw conclusions about the conditions and
the characteristics of a stylized market economy.
First, the definition of a steady state. A steady state is characterized by the sequence of
kt+1 = kt ≡ k̄. When k̄ = 0, we say that the steady state is a corner steady state. When
k̄ = +∞ the economy grows without limit. When k̄ > 0, we say that the steady state is
an interior steady state.
Examplell : OLG model with logarithmic utility function and Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion









Observe that the steady state only depends on parameters. Once we know the steady-
state value k̄, we can calculate the steady-state values of the wage, the interest rate and
the consumption levels of the young and the old generations.
Note that such a dynamic model does not display long-term growth in income per capita
because kt+1 − kt = 0 at the steady state. The reason is the same as in the Solow model:
as long as there are diminsihing returns to physical capital Kt, no long-term growth can
emerge.
Dynamics
Once we have found the steady state of our economy, the next question is whether the
economy converges to it. In other words, we have to show that the sequence of (1 +
n)kt+1 = φ(wt, Rt+1) is a monotonic sequence. The condition for monotonic dynamics is
that the function φ(wt, Rt+1) is continuous and non-decreasing on the domain k ∈ ]0,+∞[.
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If assumption (80) is verified, then the dynamics is monotonic and the economy converges
to the steady state. The question is: which steady state does the economy converge to?
Three possible cases: two cases at the boundaries of the domain (k̄ = 0 and k̄ = +∞)
and one case at the interior of the domain (k̄ > 0). The infinite case k̄ = +∞ can be
excluded because unlimited growth is impossible in an OLG model due to the fact that
saving is bounded by the wage. The other boundary case, k̄ = 0, is possible if the saving
function is convex for low values of k. Such a steady state is called a poverty trap and the
OLG model is a relevant framework to study it. If saving is a strictly concave function of
k, the steady state is interior (k̄ > 0), unique and globally stable.
Examplell : OLG model with logarithmic utility function and Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion
The logaritmic utility function satisfies assumption (80). In fact, the intertemporal elas-
ticity of subsitution of a logarithmic utility function is one. Therefore, the dynamics of
an OLG model with logarithmic preferences and Cobb-Douglas technology converges to
its unique interior steady state.
7 Optimality
In this section, our aim is to study the optimality of a stationary equilibrium of an OLG
model. Two questions are related to optimality:
1) Is the stationary equilibrium of the decentralized economy a social optimum?
2) Is the stationary equilibrium of the decentralized economy Pareto optimal?7 In other
words, does this stationary equilibrium verify the First Welfare Theorem (FWT)?
Until now, the optimizing behaviors have been considered from the point of view of
a single generation who cared to maximize her own lifecycle welfare regardless of the
welfare impact of her decisions to the other generations. We now turn to the welfare
of the young and old generations living at the same time and investigate which saving
decision would maximize the total welfare at every time period. If the saving decision
made selfishly by a single generation (decentralized economy) turns out to be identical to
the saving decision necessary to maximize the welfare of two generations living at the same
time at any time period, then the steady state obtained in the decentralized economy is
the Golden Rule (=social optimum). Put differently, is the private optimum (individual
welfare maximization) the same as the social optimum (social welfare maximization)? If
7Pareto optimality is obtained when it is no longer possible to increase the welfare of one individual
without worsening the welfare of another individual. Be aware that our optimality investigation compares
welfare results across generations and not across individuals within a generation. In the present OLG
model, the representative agent’s assumption prevents us from studying distributional issues within a
generation. The study of income inequalities requires a more complex OLG model, in which agents are
heterogeneous withing a generation.
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not, is the private optimum Pareto optimal? If it is Pareto optimal, the private optimum
satisfies the FWT and moving from the private optimum to the social optimum cannot
be Pareto improving.
The individual welfare maximization is constrained by the individual resources. The social
welfare maximization is contrained by the resources of the aggregate economy. At time t,
the resource constraint of the aggregate economy is
Yt = It +Ntct +Nt−1dt (84)
where the aggregate ouptut is on the left-hand side (resources of the aggregate economy)
and the aggregate spending is on the right-hand side. The aggregate spending includes
the aggregate investment It, the consumption by the young generation Ntct and the
consumption by the old generation Nt−1dt at time t. Using Equation (72) and taking the
fact that Lt = Nt, we can rewrite (84) in per-worker terms:




where yt ≡ YtNt is the income per worker.
8
The condition for the steady state of the decentralized economy to be a social optimum
is that a value of k̄ solves the following system of equations:
(1 + n)k̄t+1 = φ(w̄t, R̄t+1) (86)








c̄t, d̄t, c̄t+1, d̄t+1 > 0 (89)
where Equation (86) is the dynamic equation of the decentralized OLG economy, i.e. the
dynamic equation for the optimizing generation t, while Equations (87) and (88) are the
resource constraints of the aggregate OLG economy during the lifecycle of generation t.
Since the study of this economy from two points of view (one from the point of a single
generation and one point of view of the total population living at a time) is carried out at
the steady state, you can observe that Equations (87) and (88) are identical. Therefore,
we can rewrite the condition for a value of k̄ to result in a social optimum as
(1 + n)k̄t+1 = φ(w̄t, R̄t+1) (90)




c̄t, d̄t, > 0 (92)
8Observe that the resource constraint is not divided by the total population. In fact, we are inter-
ested in comparing the welfare of a single welfare-maximizing generation and the social welfare for two
generations living at the same time. This is the reason why we expressed the aggregate resource per
worker.
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Equation (90) is the dynamic equation for the generation t whose optimal saving function
is φ(w̄t, R̄t+1). Once preferences and technology are given, the private optimum is known.
But, what is the welfare optimum of the aggregate economy? The social optimum con-
dition is the maximization of the welfare of two generations living at the same time, i.e.










= ȳt− (1 + n)k̄t+1. Therefore, we are looking for a value of k̄ generating a
social optimum, which we call k̄GR: the Golden-rule steady-state capital stock per worker.
This value of k̄ = k̄GR is the solution to the following social maximization problem:
max
k̄GR
Af(k̄GR)− (1 + n)k̄GR (94)
where ȳGR = Af(k̄GR) and Af(k̄GR) − (1 + n)k̄GR = c̄t + d̄t1+n . The first-order condition
of (94) is
Af ′(k̄GR) = 1 + n (95)
Equation (95) gives the condition for a steady-state capital stock per worker to maximize
the welfare of the young and old generations living at the same time. This condition is
called the Golden Rule.
Is the steady state capital stock per worker, resulting from the decentralized economy, a
social optimum? The condition for it is that k̄GR also solves Equation (90), the private
welfare maximization:
(1 + n)k̄GR = φ(w̄GR, R̄GR) (96)
If condition (96) is satisfied, then the long-term equilibrium of a market economy (i.e.
the long-term equilibrium of the decentralized economy) is a social optimum. Observe
condition (96). It is very unlikely that condition (96) is verified. To be verified, it is
necessary that the competitive factor prices are w̄GR and R̄GR. Since markets are perfectly
competitive, no agent can fix factor prices equal to w̄GR and R̄GR. Therefore, the chance
for condition (96) to hold is one among many and no market forces, alone, can single it
out.
However, if a government finds a way to redistribute wealth across generations as to
generate saving equal to φ(w̄GR, R̄GR), then the government intervention can help market
forces to single out the steady state corresponding to the Golden Rule. Then the question
is whether it is Pareto improving to move from the private optimum to the social optimum.
If k̄ < k̄GR, then the steady state of the decentralized economy k̄ is Pareto optimal be-
cause it is not possible to reach the Golden Rule without imposing a decrease in total
consumption. In fact, increasing k̄ to reach k̄GR requires higher saving from early gener-
ations, i.e. a decrease in their first-period consumption and a decrease in the return to
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physical capital (and, hence, saving). Therefore, the private optimum is Pareto optimal.
We say that it verifies the FWT.
If k̄ > k̄GR, this is the opposite situation. The steady state of the decentralized economy
is not Pareto optimal because it is possible to decrease the steady-state capital-stock per
worker by imposing less saving and more total consumption. We say that the private
optimum does not verify the FWT. But, we can decrease k̄ to reach k̄GR by lowering
saving from early generations, i.e. increasing their first-period consumption, which results
in a higher return to physical capital (and, hence, saving) and, therefore, an increase in
consumption for all generations. The Pareto optimum reached by this reallocation of
ressources over time is the social optimum (Golden Rule). When the Pareto optimum is
obtained by reallocating resources over time and, thus, by reducing the individual optimal
saving level to increase total consumption, we say that this Pareto optimum verifies the
Second Wefare Theorem (SWT).9
To conclude, the steady state of a decentralized economy of an OLG model with two
periods and perfect foresight may violate the FWT but can be modified by an appropriate
reallocation of ressources across generations to reach a Pareto optimum verifying the SWT.
If the steady state of this decentralized economy is Pareto optimal (verifying the FWT),
the process to reach the Golden Rule, i.e. increasing saving from early generations, is
obviously not Pareto-improving.
Examplell : OLG model with logarithmic utility function and Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion
















where k̄DE is the steady-state capital stock per worker of the decentralized economy with
log utility and Cobb-Douglas production technology. This decentralized economy is a
social optimum if and only if
k̄DE = k̄GR (99)
9The Golden Rule should not be confused with the Pareto optimum. The Golden Rule is the social
optimum while the Pareto optimum is a situation where the welfare of some can no longer be improved
without worsening the others’ welfare. For instance, a private optimum can be Pareto optimal although
it is not a social optimum. This is the case in an OLG model when k̄ < k̄GR. However, the Golden Rule
is always Pareto optimal. When it is possible to reach the Golden Rule, the macroeconomic equilibrium
is a social optimum and Pareto optimal.
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This condition is restrictive and it is unlikely that a real market economy verifies it.







We can conclude that the decentralized economy with log utility and Cobb-Douglas




1−α , so k̄DE > k̄GR, which means that the FWT is violated. There is thus room to
improve the welfare of all generations by reaching a lower steady-state capital stock per
worker corresponding to the Golden Rule.
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